The Seven-Year Fix: Rebuilding US Shipbuilding and Tech with Foreign Pros

The United States is poised to embark on a seven-year industrial rehabilitation program fueled by foreign expertise, according to recent clarifications from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent regarding the Trump administration’s H-1B visa policy. This new directive comes on the heels of President Trump’s acknowledgment that the US is facing a talent deficit in key technical areas. While Trump’s call to “bring talent into the country” was initially viewed as a potential retreat from his immigration hardline, Bessent has framed it as a targeted, temporary measure designed to resuscitate dying American industries. The plan involves granting visas to skilled foreign workers for a period of three to seven years, during which their primary role will be to train American employees to take over their jobs.
Bessent’s focus on “knowledge transfer” highlights a deep concern within the administration regarding the state of US manufacturing. He specifically cited the shipbuilding and semiconductor sectors as areas where American “muscle memory” has atrophied. “An American can’t have that job, not yet,” Bessent stated, pointing out that years of outsourcing have left the domestic workforce without the specific skills required to operate these complex industries. The solution, therefore, is to import the expertise needed to rebuild these capabilities. The foreign workers are viewed as essential partners in this rebuilding phase, serving as the bridge that allows the US to cross from a state of dependency to one of industrial autonomy.
The policy is heavily reliant on the concept of a “train and leave” lifecycle. Bessent was explicit that once the knowledge transfer is successful—envisaged to take anywhere from three to seven years—the foreign experts would “return home.” This stipulation is designed to reassure the American public that the influx of foreign workers is not permanent. It reframes the H-1B program as a tool for national strengthening rather than a threat to domestic employment. The narrative suggests that the temporary presence of foreign workers is the price the US must pay to regain its status as a manufacturing superpower.
President Trump’s rhetoric supports this “learning first” approach. His refusal to accept that the US currently has enough talent—”No, you don’t… People have to learn”—underscores the administration’s belief that a skills gap is the primary obstacle to economic growth. By acknowledging this weakness, Trump and Bessent are positioning the new visa policy as a necessary corrective measure. They are asking the country to accept a temporary influx of foreign teachers to ensure a future where American workers are the most skilled in the world.
This “home run” strategy, as Bessent calls it, is an ambitious attempt to reverse decades of deindustrialization. It presumes that the complex skills required for modern semiconductor manufacturing and naval construction can be effectively transferred within a few years. It also assumes that the US can dictate the terms of global talent flow, attracting the best minds for short-term contracts. If successful, it could serve as a model for how nations can leverage global migration for local gain. If it fails, however, it could leave the US with a half-trained workforce and a continued reliance on foreign labor that the administration claims it wants to end.